On the Solvability of Inductive Problems: A Study in Epistemic Topology by Baltag, Alexandru et al.
R. Ramanujam (Ed.): TARK 2015
EPTCS 215, 2016, pp. 81–98, doi:10.4204/EPTCS.215.7
c© A. Baltag, N. Gierasimczuk & S. Smets
This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution License.
On the Solvability of Inductive Problems: A Study in
Epistemic Topology
Alexandru Baltag Nina Gierasimczuk Sonja Smets
Institute for Logic, Language and Computation
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
A.Baltag@uva.nl Nina.Gierasimczuk@gmail.com S.J.L.Smets@uva.nl
We investigate the issues of inductive problem-solving and learning by doxastic agents. We provide
topological characterizations of solvability and learnability, and we use them to prove that AGM-style
belief revision is “universal”, i.e., that every solvable problem is solvable by AGM conditioning.
1 Introduction
When in the course of observations it becomes necessary for agents to arrive at a generalization, they
should declare, along with their conjecture, the extent of their certainty. The problem of induction seems
formidable if a standard of absolute certainty is imposed on the learner. Indeed, as is well-known in
Philosophy of Science, the so-called problem of empirical underdetermination (i.e., the fact that typically
the data are compatible with more than one hypothesis) rules out any chance of obtaining infallible
knowledge in empirical research. But apart from the conclusions based on absolute certainty (cf. [13,
10, 15]), learners can produce hypotheses based on beliefs. It is thus strange that Formal Learning
Theory and Belief Revision Theory developed completely independently from each other, and that they
have generally maintained their distance ever since.
However, there does exist a line of research that combines belief revision with learning-theoretic no-
tions, line pursued by Kelly [21, 26], Kelly, Schulte and Hendricks [19], Martin and Osherson [28] and
ourselves [13, 3, 4, 14]. In this paper we continue this research program, using topological characteriza-
tions and methods.
An inductive problem consists of a state space, a family of “potential observations”, and a “question”
(i.e., a partition of the state space). These observations provide data for learning. The problem is solvable
if there exists a learner that, after observing “enough” pieces of data, eventually stabilizes on the correct
answer. A special case of solvability is learnability in the limit, corresponding to the solvability of the
“ultimate” question: ‘What is the actual state of the world?’. This notion matches the usual learning-
theoretic concept of identifiability in the limit [31, 16, 29].
The aim of the paper is twofold. First, we give topological characterizations of the notions of solv-
ability (and learnability), in terms of topological separation principles. Intuitively, the ability to reliably
learn the true answer to a question, is related to the possibility to “separate” answers by observations. The
second goal is to use these topological results to look at the “solving power” of well-behaved doxastic
agents, such as the ones whose beliefs satisfy the usual KD45 postulates of doxastic logic, as well as the
standard AGM postulates of rational belief-revision [1]. We look at a particularly simple and canonical
type of doxastic agent, who forms beliefs by AGM conditioning.
Our main result is that AGM conditioning is universal for problem-solving, i.e., that every solvable
problem can be solved by AGM conditioning. This means that (contrary to some prior claims), AGM
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belief-revision postulates are not an obstacle to problem-solving. As a special case, it follows that AGM
conditioning is also “universal for learning” (every learnable space can be learned by conditioning).1
The close connections between Epistemology and General Topology have already been noticed long
ago [32, 20]. Based on these connections, Kevin Kelly started a far-reaching program [20, 22] meant to
import ideas and techniques from both Formal Learning Theory and Topology into mainstream Episte-
mology, and show their relevance to the induction problem in Philosophy of Science. A further connec-
tion is the one with Ockham’s Razor, that would
(...) guarantee that always choosing the simplest theory compatible with experience and
hanging on to it while it remains the simplest is both necessary and sufficient for efficiency
of inquiry. [22]
Simplicity has been claimed to have topological characteristics—the simplicity order should in some
way follow the structure imposed on the uncertainty range by possible tests and observations. It has
also been linked with the notion of minimal mind change, where the learning agent keeps the conjecture
changes to a minimum [20, 30].
Taken together, our results can be seen as a vindication both of the general topological program
in Inductive Epistemology [20, 22] and of the AGM Belief Revision Theory [1]. On the first front,
our general topological characterizations of learning-theoretic concepts seem to confirm Kelly’s long-
standing claim that Inductive Epistemology can be seen mathematically as a branch of General Topology.
On the second front, our universality result seems to vindicate Belief Revision Theory as a canonical form
of learning.2
2 Epistemic Spaces and Inductive Problems
Definition 1. An epistemic space is a pair S = (S,O) consisting of a state space S and a countable (or
finite) set of observable properties (“data”) O ⊆P(S). We denote by by Os := {O ∈ O | s ∈ O} the set
of all observable properties (holding) at a given state s.
One can think of the states in S as “possible worlds”, in the tradition of Kripke and Lewis. The sets
O ∈ O represent properties of the world that are in principle observable: if true, such a property will
eventually be observed (although there is no upper bound on the time needed to come to observe it).
To keep things simple, we assume that at each step of the learning process only one property is
observed. As for the countability of the set O , it is natural to think of observables as properties which
can be expressed by means of a language or numerical coding system, generated from a grammar with a
finite vocabulary. Any such family O will be (at most) countable.
We denote by O∩ the family of all finite intersections of observations from O , and by O∗ the family
of all finite sequences of observations. Such a finite sequence σ = (O0,O1, . . . ,Oi) ∈ O∗ is called a
data sequence, and its i-th component is denoted by σi := Oi. It is easy to see that both O∩ and O∗ are
countable.
A data stream is a countable sequence ~O = (O0,O1, . . .) ∈ Oω of data from O (here, ω is the set of
natural numbers, so Oω is the set of all maps assigning an observable property to every natural number).
We use the following notation: ~On is the n-th element in ~O; ~O[n] is the initial segment of ~O of length n,
1This special case is a topological translation of one of our previous results [3, 4]. However, the result about problem-
solving universality is not only new and much more general, but also much harder to prove, involving new topological notions
and results.
2And in the same time (if we adopt a “simplicity” interpretation of the prior), this last result can be seen as a vindication of
Ockham’s razor (in line with Kevin Kelly’s program).
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Figure 1: A problem P (left-hand side) and its refinement P′ (right-hand side), see Example 3
(O0, . . . ,On−1); set(~O) := {O | O is an element of ~O} is the set of all data in ~O; ∗ is the concatenation
operator on strings.
The intuition is that at stage n of a data stream, the agent observes the information in On. A data
stream captures a possible future history of observations in its entirety, while a data sequence captures
only a finite part of such a history.
Given a state s ∈ S, a data stream for s is a stream ~O ∈ Oω such that Os = {O ∈ O | ⋂ni=0 Oi ⊆
O for some n ∈ ω}. Such a stream is “sound” (every data in ~O is true at s) and “complete” (every true
data is entailed by some finite set of observations in ~O).
Example 1. Let our epistemic space S = (S,O) be the real numbers, with observable properties given
by open intervals with rational endpoints: S := R, O := {(a,b) | a,b ∈ Q,a ≤ b}, where (a,b) := {x ∈
R | a < x < b}. For instance, observables may represent measurements of a physical quantity (such as a
position along a one-dimensional line) that takes real numbers as its possible values. In such case, for
any state x ∈ R and any two sequences an,bn ∈ Q of rational numbers, such that an ≤ x ≤ bn and both
sequences converge to x, the sequence (a0,b0), . . . ,(an,bn), . . . is a (sound and complete) data stream for
x.
Other examples include standard n-dimensional Euclidean spaces, e.g., S = R3 with O consisting of
all open balls with rational radius and center.
Definition 2. An inductive problem is a pair P = (S,Q) consisting of an epistemic space S = (S,O)
together with a “question” Q, i.e., a partition3 of S. The cells Ai of the partition Q are called answers.
Given s ∈ S, the unique A ∈Q with s ∈ A is called the answer to Q at s, and denoted As. We say that a
problem P′ = (S,Q′) is a refinement of another problem P= (S,Q) (or that the corresponding question
Q′ is a refinement of the question Q) if every answer of Q is a disjoint union of answers of Q′.
The most refined question concerns the identity of the real world.
Example 2. The learning question on a space S is Q = {{s} | s ∈ S} and corresponds to ‘What is the
actual state?’.
Example 3. Let S= (S,O), where S = {s, t,u,v), O = {U,V,P,Q}, with U = {s, t}, V = {s}, P = {u,v},
Q = {u}. Take the problem P = (S,Q), given by the question Q = {{t,u},{s,v}} depicted on the left-
hand side of Figure 1. This can obviously be refined to obtain the problem P′ = (S,Q′) given by the
learning question Q = {{s},{t},{u},{v}} for this space, as depicted on the right-hand side of Figure 1.
3This means that
⋃
i∈I Ai = S, and Ai∩A j = /0 for all i 6= j.
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3 Learning and Problem-Solving
Definition 3. Let S = (S,O) be an epistemic space and let σ0, . . . ,σn ∈ O . An agent (also called a
“learner”, or a “learning method”) is a map L that associates to any epistemic space S and any data
sequence (σ0, . . . ,σn) some family LS(σ0, . . . ,σn) ⊆ P(S) of subsets of S, satisfying a “consistency”
condition: /0 6∈LS(σ0, . . . ,σn) whenever
⋂n
i=o σi 6= /0.
Intuitively, after observing the data sequence ~σ = (σ0, . . . ,σn), we can say that agent L believes a
proposition P after observing the data sequence ~σ = (σ0, . . . ,σn), and write B~σL P iff P∈LS(σ0, . . . ,σn).
We can also interpret this as a conditional belief, rather than as revised belief, the agent believes every
P ∈ LS(σ0, . . . ,σn) conditional on σ0, . . . ,σn. However, in the end we are of course interested in the
actual revised beliefs after observing the data, so the assumption in this case is that conditional beliefs
guide the agent’s revision strategy: they “pre-encode” future belief revisions, to use a term coined by
Johan van Benthem [6]. The above consistency simply means that each of the agent’s beliefs is consistent
whenever the observed data are consistent.
A doxastic agent is one whose set LS(σ0, . . . ,σn) of beliefs forms a (proper) filter on S when ob-
serving consistent data; in other words, her beliefs are (consistent when possible, and also) inference-
closed (i.e., if P ⊆ Q and P ∈ LS(σ0, . . . ,σn), then Q ∈ LS(σ0, . . . ,σn)) and conjunctive (i.e., if
P,Q ∈ LS(σ0, . . . ,σn) then (P∩Q) ∈ LS(σ0, . . . ,σn)). Hence, for any doxastic agent L and every
consistent data sequence ~σ , the belief operator B~σ
L
(as defined above) satisfy the usual KD45 axioms of
doxastic logic.
A standard agent is a doxastic agent L whose beliefs form a principal filter, i.e., all her beliefs are
entailed by one “strongest belief”; formally, a doxastic agent L is standard iff for every data sequence
~σ over any epistemic space S there exists some set LS(~σ), such that
LS(~σ) = {P ⊆ S | LS(~σ)⊆ P}.
It is easy to see that in this case, we must have LS(~σ) =
⋂
LS(~σ). Indeed, we can equivalently define a
doxastic agent L to be standard iff
⋂
LS(~σ) ∈LS(~σ) holds for all data sequences ~σ . Standard agents
are globally consistent whenever possible: ⋂LS(σ0, . . . ,σn) 6= /0 whenever
⋂n
i=o σi 6= /0.
Traditional learning methods in Formal Learning Theory correspond to our standard agents, and they
are typically identified with the map L (given by LS(σ0, . . . ,σn) :=
⋂
LS(σ0, . . . ,σn)). From now on we
follow this tradition, and refer to standard agents using the map L. But in general we do not restrict
ourselves to standard agents.
An AGM agent is an agent L ≤ who forms beliefs by AGM conditioning, i.e., it comes endowed with
a map that associates any epistemic space S some total preorder4 ≤S on S, called “prior” plausibility
relation; and whose beliefs after observing any data sequence ~σ = (σ0, . . . ,σn) are given by
L
≤
S
(~σ) := {P ⊆ S | ∃s ∈
n⋂
i=0
σi ∀t ∈
n⋂
i=0
σi (t ≤ s ⇒ t ∈ P)}.
Intuitively, t ≤ s means that t is at least as plausible as s (according to our agent). So, an AGM agent
believes P conditional on a data sequence ~σ iff P is true in all the states (consistent with the data) that
are “plausible enough”.
4A total preorder on S is a binary relation ≤ on S that is reflexive, transitive, and connected (i.e., for all s, t ∈ S, we have
either s ≤ t or t ≤ s).
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It is easy to see that every AGM agent is a doxastic agent: L ≤
S
(~σ) is a proper filter whenever⋂n
i=0 σi 6= /0; hence, the beliefs of an AGM agent satisfy the usual KD45 axioms of doxastic logic (when
learning any consistent data sequence).
Moreover, it is well-known that in fact, the beliefs of AGM agents satisfy all the so-called AGM
axioms from Belief Revision Theory [1]: if, for any data sequence ~σ = (σ0, . . . ,σn), we set T =
L (σ0, . . . ,σn), and for any new observation φ ∈ O we set T ∗ φ = L (σ0, . . . ,σn,φ), then the result-
ing revision operator ∗ satisfies all the AGM postulates. In fact, for any AGM agent L , if we interpret
the operator B~σ
L
(as defined above) as representing a conditional belief Bσ0∧...∧σn , then the sound and
complete logic of these conditional belief operators is the so-called Conditional Doxastic Logic [8, 5]
(which is itself just a repackaging of the AGM postulates in the language of conditional logic).
Observation 1. Given a total preorder ≤ on S and a subset A ⊆ S, set
Min≤(A) := {s ∈ A | s≤ t for all t ∈ A}
for the set of ≤-minimal states in A. Let ~σ = (σ0, . . . ,σn) be any data sequence such that
Min≤(
⋂n
i=0 σi) 6= /0. Then L ≤S (~σ) is the principal filter generated by Min≤(
⋂n
i=0 σi), i.e., we have
L
≤
S
(σ0, . . . ,σn) := {P ⊆ S | Min≤(
n⋂
i=0
σi)⊆ P}.
In general though, the filter L ≤
S
(~σ) is not principal. So AGM agents are not necessarily standard
agents. But there is an important case when they are standard: whenever the preorder ≤S is well-founded
in every space S (i.e., there are no infinite chains s0 > s1 > s2 . . . of more and more plausible states). It
is easy to see that the map L associated to a standard AGM agent is given by the set of ≤-minimal states
consistent with the data:
L≤
S
(σ0, . . . ,σn) := Min≤(
n⋂
i=0
σi).
Intuitively, this means that a standard AGM agent believes a proposition P iff P is true in all the “most
plausible” states consistent with the data.
The original semantics of AGM belief was given using only standard AGM agents. But this semantics
was in fact borrowed by Grove [18] from Lewis’ semantics for conditionals [27], which did not assume
well-foundedness.5
Definition 4. Let S be an epistemic space. An agent L verifies a proposition A ⊆ S in the limit if, for
every state s ∈ S and every data stream ~O for s, we have s ∈ A iff there exists some k ∈ ω such that
A ∈LS(~O[n]) for all n≥ k. For standard agents, this means that LS(~O[n])⊆ A for all n≥ k. A set A⊆ S
is verifiable in the limit if there exists some agent that verifies A in the limit.6
An agent L falsifies a proposition A ⊆ S in the limit if, for every state s ∈ S and every data stream
for ~O for s, we have s /∈ A iff there exists some k ∈ ω such that Ac ∈L (S, ~O[n])⊆ Ac for all n ≥ k (here,
as in the rest of this paper, X c := S\X stands for the complement of X). For a standard agent, this means
L(S, ~O[n])⊆ Ac for all n ≥ k,
A proposition A⊆ S is falsifiable in the limit if there exists some agent that falsifies A in the limit.
A proposition A⊆ S is decidable in the limit if it is both verifiable and falsifiable in the limit.
5Indeed, Lewis’ definition of conditionals has a similar shape to our above definition of (conditional) beliefs for non-standard
AGM agents.
6For a discussion of the relationship between verifiability and learnability see, e.g., [20, 12].
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An agent L solves a problem P= (S,Q) if, for every state s ∈ S and every data stream ~O for s, there
exists some k ∈ ω such that As ∈LS(~O[n]) for all n ≥ k (recall that As is true answer to Q at s). For a
standard agent, this means that LS(~O[n]) ⊆ As for all n ≥ k. A problem is solvable (in the limit) if there
exists some agent that solves it.
An epistemic space S = (S,O) is learnable (by an agent L ) if the (problem given by the) learning
question QS = {{s} | s ∈ S} is solvable (by L ).
All the above notions have a standard counterpart, e.g., A is standardly verifiable if there exist some
standard agent that verifies it; P is standardly solvable if it can be solved by some standard agent, etc.
Note that standard learnability is essentially the same as Gold’s identifiability in the limit [29, 17].
Examples and Counterexamples: An example of non-learnable space S= (S,O) is obtained by taking
four abstract states S = {s, t,u,w} and two observable properties O = {V,U}, with V = {s, t,u} and
U = {t,u,w}, as depicted in Figure 2. Since states s and t satisfy the same observable properties, no
learning method will ever distinguish them.
s t u w
UV
Figure 2: A non-learnable space
But even spaces in which no two states satisfy the same observations can still be non-learnable,
e.g., all the n-dimensional Euclidean spaces from Example 1 are not learnable (though, as we will see,
many questions are solvable and many subsets are decidable over these spaces). Another example of
non-learnable space is given in Figure 3: formally, S = (S,O), where S := {sn | n ∈ ω}∪ {s∞}, and
O = {Oi | i ∈ ω}, and for any i ∈ ω , Oi := {si,si+1, . . .}∪{s∞}.
s0 s1 s2 s3 s∞
O0 O1 O2 O3 . . .
Figure 3: Another non-learnable space
In contrast, an example of learnable space is in Figure 4: formally, S = {sn | n ∈ ω} consists of
countably many distinct states, with O = {On | n ∈ ω}, where On = {s0,s1,s2, . . . ,sn}. A standard agent
that can learn this space in the limit is given by setting L(σ1, . . . ,σn) to be the maximum number (in
the natural order) in ⋂ni=0 σi, whenever there is such a maximum number, and setting L(σ1, . . . ,σn) :=⋂n
i=0 σi otherwise.
Proposition 1. Let S be an epistemic space, A ⊆ S a proposition and P = (S,Q) an inductive problem.
Then we have the following:
• A is verifiable (falsifiable, decidable) in the limit iff it is standardly verifiable (falsifiable, decid-
able) in the limit.
• P is solvable iff it is standardly solvable.
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s0 s1 s2 s3 s4
O0 O1 O2 O3 O4 . . .
Figure 4: A learnable space
• S is learnable iff it is standardly learnable.
Proof. Let A ⊆ S be a set that is verifiable (falsifiable, decidable) by an agent L on an epistemic space
S. We construct a standard agent that does the same thing, by setting, for every data sequence ~σ ∈ O∗:
LS(~σ) := A if A ∈LS(~σ), LS(~σ) := Ac if A 6∈LS(~σ) but Ac ∈LS(~σ), and LS(~σ) := S otherwise. Also,
on any other space S′ = (S′,O ′), we set by default LS′(~σ ′) := S′.
Similarly, let P = (S,Q) be a problem that is solvable by L . Let ≤ be some arbitrary well-order of
the set Q. (Such a well-order exists, by the Well-Ordering Theorem.) We construct a standard agent who
also solves P, by setting LS(~σ) := A if A is the first answer in Q (according to ≤) such that A ∈LS(~σ)
holds; and LS(~σ) := S if no such answer exists. (As before, we can extend our agent to any other space
S′ = (S′,O ′), by setting LS′(~σ ′) := S′.)
By applying this to the learning problem Q = {{s} | s ∈ S}, we obtain the similar result for learn-
ability.
In conclusion, everything that can be learned by any agent can also be learned by some standard
agent. However, this is no longer true when we restrict to more canonical types of agents (such as AGM
agents).
Proposition 2. There exist spaces that are learnable, but not learnable by standard AGM agents. Hence,
there exist solvable problems that are not solvable by standard AGM agents.
Proof. Consider a counterexample from [13, 3, 4]. Take the epistemic model from Figure 4. This space
is learnable, and thus learnable by AGM conditioning, but it is not learnable by standard conditioning.
Indeed, this space is learnable by conditioning only with respect to the following non-wellfounded prior:
s0 > s1 > .. . > sn > sn+1 > .. .
4 The Observational Topology
In this section, we assume familiarity with the following notions: topology τ (identified with its family
of open subsets) over a set S of points, topological space (S,τ), open sets, closed sets, interior Int(X)
and closure X of a set X , (open) neighborhood of a point s, base of a topology and local base (of
neighborhoods) at a point. We use letters U , U ′, etc., for open sets in τ , and letters C, C′, etc., for closed
sets.
A space is said to be second-countable if its topology has a countable base. Given a topological space
(S,τ), the specialization preorder ⊑⊆ S×S is defined in the following way: for any s, t ∈ S, we set
s ⊑ t iff ∀U ∈ τ (s ∈U ⇒ t ∈U).
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Separation Principles. In this paper we use four key topological separation notions. The first is the
well-known separation axiom T 0, which will be satisfied by all the topologies that arise in our setting.
The second is the separation axiom T D. This condition (together with countability) will be shown
to characterize learnable spaces. The next two notions are analogues of T D separation for questions.
Instead of asking for open sets that separate points (states), these conditions require the existence of
open sets that separate answers (to the same question). The concept of locally closed questions is a
first analogue of T D, and it will be shown to characterize in some sense solvable problems. Finally, the
notion of linearly separated questions is a stronger analogue of T D for questions, which characterizes a
stronger type of solvability, what we will call direct solvability by (AGM) conditioning.
Definition 5. A topological space (S,τ) satisfies the separation axiom T 0 if the specialization preorder
is actually a partial order, i.e., it is antisymmetric: s ⊑ t ⊑ s implies s = t. Equivalently, if s 6= t, then
there exists some “separating” open U, such that either s ∈U, t 6∈U, or s 6∈U, t ∈U.
The space (S,τ) satisfies the separation axiom T D iff for every point s ∈ S, there is an open Ux ∋ x
such that y 6⊑ x for all y ∈ Ox \ {x}. Equivalently: for every s ∈ S there is an open U ∈ τ such that
{s} =U ∩{s}.
Essentially, T 0 says that every two points s 6= t can be separated (by an open U ) one way or another
(i.e., either s ∈U , t 6∈U , or s 6∈U , t ∈U ), while T D essentially says that every point s can be separated
(by an open neighborhood) from all the points t 6= s that are inseparable from s.7
Definition 6. Given a topological space (S,τ), a set A ⊆ S is locally closed if it is the intersection
A =U ∩C of an open set U with a closed set C. Equivalently, if it is of the form A =U ∩A for some open
U.
A set is ω-constructible if it is a countable union of locally closed sets.
A question Q (partition of S) is locally closed if all its answers are locally closed. A problem P is
locally closed if its associated question is locally closed.
Essentially, locally closed questions are partitions with the property that every “answer” (i.e., parti-
tion cell) A can be separated (by an open neighborhood) from all the non-A-states that are inseparable
from A.8
Definition 7. A question Q is linearly separated if there exists some total order E on the answers in Q,
such that A∩
⋃
B⊳A B = /0. In other words, every answer A can be separated (by some open UA ⊇ A) from
the union of all the previous answers: UA∩B = /0 for all B⊳A.
Essentially, a linearly separated question is one whose answers can be totally ordered by a “plausibil-
ity” (or “simplicity”) order, in such a way that every answer A can be separated (by an open neighborhood
UA ⊇ A) from all answers that are “more plausible” (or “simpler”) than A.
Definition 8. The observational topology τS associated with an epistemic space S= (S,O) is the topol-
ogy generated by O (i.e., the smallest collection of subsets of S, that includes O ∪{ /0,S} and is closed
under finite intersections and arbitrary unions).
From now on, we will always implicitly consider our epistemic spaces S to also be topological
spaces (S,τS), endowed with their observational topology τS. Every topological property possessed by
the associated topological space will thus be also attributed to the epistemic space.
7A point y is “inseparable” from x if every open neighborhood of y contains x, i.e., y and x are in the topological refinement
order y⊑ x.
8Here, a state t is said to be “inseparable” from a set A if there is no open neighborhood U ∋ t that is disjoint from A.
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Observation 2. Every epistemic space is T 0 and second-countable. A (sound and complete) data stream
for s is the same as a local neighborhood base at s.
Proposition 3. Every ω-constructible set can be written as a disjoint countable union of locally closed
sets.
Proof. In order to prove this, we first recall some standard topological notions and results: A set is called
constructible if it is a finite disjoint union of locally closed sets. Obviously, all locally closed sets are
constructible. It is known that constructible sets form a Boolean algebra, i.e., the family of constructible
sets is closed under complementation, finite unions, and finite intersections.
Suppose A =
⋃
i∈ω Ai, where all Ai are locally closed. Then we can rewrite A as a disjoint union A =⋃
i∈ω Bi, where we have set Bi = Ai \ (
⋃
k<i Ak) = Ai∩
⋂
k<i Ack, for every i. Since Bi’s are generated from
locally closed sets using complementation and finite intersections, they must be constructible. Hence,
each Bi can be written as disjoint finite unions of locally closed sets Bi = ⋃1≤ j≤i Bi j. Hence, we can
write A =
⋃
i∈ω
⋃
1≤ j≤i Bi j as a disjoint countable union of locally closed sets.
Definition 9. A pseudo-stratification is a finite or ω-long sequence of locally closed sets 〈Ai | i < λ 〉
(where λ ∈ ω ∪{ω}), which form a partition of S satisfying the following condition:
if j < i then either Ai∩A j = /0 or Ai ⊆ A j.
Proposition 4. Every countable locally closed question can be refined to a pseudo-stratification.
Proof. Suppose Π = {Ai | i ∈ ω} is a countable locally closed question (partition of S). We first show
the following:
Claim. There exists a family {(Πi,<i) | i ∈ ω}, satisfying
(1) each Πi is a finite partition of Ai into locally closed sets;
(2) each <i is a total order on Πi;
(3) if j < i, E ∈ Π j, B ∈ Πi, then either B⊆ E or B⊆ Ec;
(4) if B,E ∈ Πi, E <i B, then B⊆ Ec.
Proof of Claim: We construct (Πn,<n) by recursion: for n = 0, set Π0 := {A0}, with <0 trivial. For the
step n+1: assume given {(Πi,<i) | i≤ n} satisfying the above four conditions (for i≤ n). We set
Πn+1 := {B f | f :
n⋃
i=1
Πi →{0,1}},
where for each function f : ⋃ni=1 Πi →{0,1} we have set
B f := An+1∩
⋂
{E | E ∈ f−1(0)}∩⋂{Ec | E ∈ f−1(1)}.
It is obvious that the B f ’s are locally closed (given that An+1 is locally closed) and that they form a
partition of An+1. So condition (1) is satisfied.
It is also easy to check condition (2) for i = n+ 1: let j < n+ 1, E ∈ Π j and B f ∈ Πn+1. Then we
have either f (E) = 0, in which case B f ⊆ E (by construction of B f ), or else f (E) = 1, in which case
B f ⊆ E
c
.
To construct the order <n+1, observe first that there is a natural total order <(n) on the disjoint union⋃n
i=1 Πi, namely the one obtained by concatenating the orders <0, <1, . . . , <n. More precisely, if, for
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every B ∈
⋃n
i=1 Πi, we set i(B) to be the unique index i≤ n such that B ∈Πi, then the order <(n) is given
by setting: B <(n) E iff either i(B)< i(E), or else i(B) = i(E) and B <i(B) E .
Now, the order <n+1 on B f ’s is given by the lexicographic order induced by <(n) on the functions f
(thought as “words” written with the letters 0 and 1). More precisely, we set:
B f <n+1 Bg
iff there exists some set E ∈
⋃n
i=1 Πi such that
(
∀E ′ <(n) E f (E ′) = g(E ′), but f (E)< g(E)
)
,
where < is the usual order 0 < 1 on {0,1}. Clearly, <n+1 is a total order on Πn+1, so condition (2) is
satisfied.
Finally, we check condition (4) for n+ 1, let B f ,Bg ∈ Πn+1 such that B f <n+1 Bg. By definition
of the order <n+1, this means that there exists some E ∈
⋃n
i=1 Πi such that for all E ′ <(n) E we have
f (E ′) = g(E ′) but f (E) < g(E), i.e., f (E) = 0 and g(E) = 1. By the construction of B f ’s, f (E) = 0
implies that B f ⊆ E, from which we get B f ⊆ E , and thus E
c
⊆ B f
c
. Similarly, g(E) = 1 implies that
Bg ⊆ E
c
. So we have Bg ⊆ E
c
⊆ B f
c
, and thus by transitivity of inclusion we get Bg ⊆ B f
c
. This
completes the proof of our Claim.
Given now the above Claim, we can prove our Lemma by taking as our refined partition
Π′ :=
⋃
i∈ω
Πi.
Clearly, Π′ is a refinement of Π consisting of locally closed sets. We now define a well-order <′ on
Π′ as the concatenation of all the ≤i’s.9 Obviously, <′ is a total order of type ≤ ω on Π′, so we get
finite or ω-long sequence that enumerates Π′. The above properties (3) and (4) ensure that this is a
pseudo-stratification.
Lemma 1. Given a pseudo-stratification 〈Ai | i < λ 〉 (of length λ ≤ ω), there exists a λ -long sequence
of open sets 〈Ui | i < λ 〉, satisfying:
(1) Ui∩Ai = Ai;
(2) if j < i and Ui∩A j 6= /0, then Ai ⊆ A j.
Proof. We know that each Ai is locally closed, so there exists some open set UAi ∈ τ such that UAi ∩Ai =
Ai. Now, for all i ∈ ω set
Ui :=UAi ∩
⋂
{A j
c
| j < i,Ai ⊆ A jc}.
Let us first check that the sequence 〈Ui | i < λ 〉 satisfies condition (1):
Ui∩Ai = (UAi ∩
⋂
{A j
c
| j < i,Ai ⊆ A jc})∩Ai
= (Ui∩Ai)∩
⋂
{A j
c
| j < i,Ai ⊆ A jc}
= Ai∩
⋂
{A j
c
| j < i,Ai ⊆ A jc}= Ai
9Once again, one can specify this more precisely by first defining i : Π′ → ω by choosing i(B) to be the unique index i such
that B ∈ Πi, and finally defining: B <′ E iff either i(B)< i(E), or else i(B) = i(E) and B <i(B) E.
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Second, let us check condition (2): Suppose that we have j < i and Ui∩A j 6= /0, but Ai 6⊆A j. Since (Ai)i<λ
is a pseudo-stratified sequence, from j < i and Ai 6⊆ A j we can derive Ai ⊆ A jc. By the construction of
Ui, this implies that Ui ⊆ A j
c
, and hence that Ui ∩A j ⊆ A j
c
∩A j ⊆ A j
c
∩A j = /0, which contradicts the
assumption that Ui∩A j 6= /0.
Lemma 2. Every pseudo-stratification is linearly separated.
Proof. Let Π = {Ai | i < λ} be a pseudo-stratification (with λ ≤ ω), and let 〈Ui | i < λ 〉 be a sequence
satisfying the conditions of Lemma 1. It is clear that, in order to prove our intended result, it is enough
to construct a total order E on the set {i ∈ ω |i < λ}= λ ⊆ ω , such that
Ui∩A j 6= /0 ⇒ iE j.
For this, we first define a reflexive relation R on λ , by setting
iR j ⇐⇒Ui∩A j 6= /0.
Claim: There are no non-trivial cycles
i1R · · · inRi1 (with distinct ik’s).
Proof of Claim: Let i1R · · · inRi1 be a non-trivial cycle of minimal length n ≥ 2. There are two cases:
Case 1: n = 2, i.e., i1Ri2Ri1 with i2 6= i1. We must have either i1 < i2 or i2 < i1. Without loss of
generality, we can assume i1 < i2 (otherwise, just swap i1 and i2, and use the cycle i2Ri1Ri2). From i2Ri1,
we get Ui2 ∩Ai1 6= /0. This together with i1 < i2, gives us Ai2 ⊆ Ai1 (by condition (2) from Lemma 2), and
hence Ui1 ∩Ai2 ⊆Ui1 ∩Ai1 = Ai1 . From this, we get that Ui1 ∩Ai2 = (Ui1 ∩Ai2)∩Ai2 ⊆ Ai1 ∩Ai2 = /0 (since
i1 6= i2, so Ai1 and Ai2 are different answers, hence disjoint), so we conclude that Ui1 ∩Ai2 = /0. But on
the other hand, from i1Ri2 we get Ui1 ∩Ai2 6= /0. Contradiction.
Case 2: n > 2. Since all the ik’s are distinct, there must exist a (unique) smallest index in the
cycle. Without loss of generality (since otherwise we can rearrange the indices, permuting the cycle),
we can assume that i3 is the smallest index. (Note that, since n > 2, there must be at least three distinct
successive indices i1, i2, i3.) So i3 < i1 and i3 < i2. From i2Ri3 we get Ui2 ∩Ai2 6= /0. Since i3 < i2, it
follows that Ai2 ⊆ Ai3 (by Lemma 2). But on the other hand, i1Ri2 gives us Ui1 ∩Ai2 6= /0. We hence
obtain Ui1 ∩Ai3 6= /0. This, together with i3 < i1, gives us Ai1 ⊆ Ai3 (again by Lemma 2). From this,
we derive Ai1 ⊆Ui1 ∩Ai3 (since Ai ⊆Ui for all i). Let now s ∈ Ai1 be any state satisfying the answer
Ai1 ⊆Ui1 ∩Ai3 . So we have s ∈Ui1 and s ∈ Ai3 , which together imply that Ui1 ∩Ai3 6= /0 (since s ∈ Ai3
implies that every open neighborhood of s intersects Ai3 ). Hence, we have i1Ri3, which means we can
shorten the cycle by eliminating i2, we obtain contradiction.
Given the above Claim, it follows that the transitive closure R∗ is a partial order on λ (which obvi-
ously includes R). By the Order Extension Principle, we can extend R∗ to a total order E on λ , which
still includes R.
5 Topological Characterization of Solvability
Definition 10. Let S = (S,O) be an epistemic space, L be a standard agent, A ⊆ S, and s ∈ A. An
A-locking sequence for s (with respect to L) is a data sequence σ = (O1, . . . ,Ok), such that:
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(1) σ is sound for s, i.e., s ∈⋂1≤i≤k Oi;
(2) if δ is any data sequence sound for s, then L(S,σ ∗δ )⊆ A.
For a given data sequence σ , we denote by LσA the set of all states in A having σ as an A-locking
sequence, i.e.,
LσA := {s ∈ A | σ is an A-locking sequence for s wrt L}.
Lemma 3. If A is verifiable in the limit by a standard agent L, then ⋃σ∈O∗ LσA = A.
Proof. Suppose not. Let A be verifiable in the limit, but such that A 6= ⋃σ∈O∗ LσA . Since all LσA ⊆ A, his
means that A 6⊆
⋃
σ∈O∗ LσA , i.e., there exists some state s ∈ A for which there is no A-locking sequence.
This means that every data sequence σ that is sound for s can be extended to a sequence δ that is also
sound for s and has L(δ ) 6⊆ A.
Let now ~O be a (sound and complete) data stream for s. We construct a new infinite data stream ~V ,
by defining increasingly longer initial segments δk of ~O, in countably many stages: we first set V0 = O0,
thus obtaining an initial segment δ0 = (O0) = (V0); at the k + 1-th stage, given some initial segment
δk = (V0,V1, . . . ,Vnk) (of some length nk), we built our next initial segment by taking any extension δk+1
of the sequence σk = (V0, . . . ,Vnk ,On+1) that is sound for s and has L(σk) 6⊆ A. The resulting infinite
stream ~V is a (sound and complete) stream for s (the completeness of ~V with respect to s follows the fact
that this stream includes all the elements of ~U ), but which contains arbitrarily long initial segments σk
with L(σk) 6⊆ A. Since s ∈ A, this contradicts the assumption that A is verifiable in the limit.
Lemma 4. If A ⊆ S is verifiable in the limit by a standard agent L, then for every data sequence σ =
(O1, . . .Ok), the set LσA is locally closed.
Proof. Let O :=⋂ki=1 Oi be the intersection of all the observations in σ . We will show that
O∩LσA = L
σ
A ,
from which the desired conclusion follows.
(⊇) If s∈ LσA , then σ is an A-locking sequence for s, hence σ is sound for s, and thus s∈
⋂n
i=1 Oi =O.
(⊆) Suppose that s ∈O∩LσA . We prove two claims:
Claim 1: For every data sequence δ that is sound for s and extends σ , we have LS(δ )⊆ A.
Proof of Claim 1: Let δ = (δ1, . . . ,δn) be a data sequence that is sound for s (i.e., s ∈ δi for all
i = 1, . . . ,n) and extends σ , i.e., n≥ k and Ui = Oi for all i≤ k). Hence,
⋂n
i=1 δi is an open neighborhood
of s, and s∈ LσA , so there must exist some t ∈
⋂n
i=1 δi such that t ∈ LσA . Hence, t ∈ A and σ is an A-locking
sequence for t. But δ extends σ and is sound for t, so (by the definition of σ being an A-locking sequence
for t), we have that L(δ )⊆ A, which concludes the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 2: We have s ∈ A.
Proof of Claim 2: Let ~V be a stream for s that extends σ (such a stream must exist, since σ is sound
for s: just take any stream for s and prefix it with σ ). Then, for every n≥ k, the sequence δn = (V1, . . . ,Vn)
is sound for s and extends σ . Hence, by the above Claim, we must have that LS(V1, . . . ,Vn) ⊆ A for all
n≥ k. But we assumed that A is verifiable in the limit, so we must have s ∈ A, which concludes the proof
of Claim 2.
From Claims 1 and 2 together, we conclude that σ is an A-locking sequence for s ∈ A, hence s ∈
LσA .
Theorem 1. Given an epistemic space (S,O), a set A⊆ S is verifiable in the limit iff it is ω-constructible.
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Proof. (⇐) Assume A = ⋃n(Un∩Cn) is a countable disjoint union of (mutually disjoint) locally closed
sets Un∩Cn (with Un open and Cn closed). We define a standard agent L for A on finite data sequences
δ = (O1, . . . ,Ok), by setting L(S,δ ) = Ac, if we have
⋂
j O j 6⊆Un for all n∈ω ; L(S,δ ) = Ac (where Ac is
the complement of A), if⋂ j O j ⊆Ccn holds for the first index n∈ω such that
⋂
j O j ⊆Un; and L(S,δ ) =A
otherwise. Then it is easy to see that L verifies A in the limit.
(⇒) Suppose that A is verifiable in the limit. By Proposition 1, it is then verifiable by a standard
agent L. By Lemma 1, A is the union of all sets LσA for all finite data sequences σ . But there are only
countably many such sequences, so this is a countable union. Moreover, by Lemma 2, each LσA is locally
closed. Hence A is a countable union of locally closed sets, i.e., an ω-constructible set.
Corollary 1. A is decidable in the limit iff both A and Ac are ω-constructible.
Proof. Follows trivially from the above results.
Theorem 2. Let P= (S,Q) be an inductive problem on an epistemic space S. The following are equiv-
alent:
(1) P is solvable (in the limit);
(2) the associated question Q is an (at most) countable family of ω-constructible answers;
(3) Q has an (at most) countable locally closed refinement.
Proof. (1)⇒ (2) : Let P be a solvable problem. By Proposition 1, there exists some standard agent that
solves it. Let L be such a standard agent that solves P.
Claim: Every answer A ∈Q is verifiable in the limit.
Proof of Claim: Let A ∈Q be an answer. We construct a standard agent LA that verifies it, by setting
LA
S
(σ) := A iff LS(σ)⊆ A, and LAS(σ) := Ac otherwise. It is easy to see that LA verifies A.
Using the Claim and Lemma 3, we obtain that, for each answer A ∈ Q, there exists some data
sequence σ ∈ O∗ such that LS(σ) ⊆ A. But O∗ is countable, so there can be only countably many
answers in Q.
By the claim above, Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we obtain that every answer A∈Q is a countable union
of locally closed sets, hence it is ω-constructible.
(2)⇒ (3) : By (2), Q is (at most) countable, say Q = {Ai | i ∈ ω}, and also each answer AI ∈Q is ω-
constructible, hence it can be written as a countable disjoint union of locally closets A =⋃k∈ω Aki (where
all Aki ’s locally closed and mutually disjoint). Then the question {Aki | i ∈ ω ,k ∈ ω} is a refinement of
Q, which is countable and locally closed.
(3)⇒ (1) : Let Q′ = {Bi | i ∈ω} be a countable closed refinement of Q′. By Corollary 1, every answer
B ∈Q′ is decidable, and so by Proposition 1, we can choose for each Bi ∈Q some standard agent Li that
decides Bi. We define now a new standard agent L, by:
LS(σ) :=
⋃
{Bi | i ∈ ω such that Li(σ)⊆ Bi}.
It is easy to see that this agent L solves Q′, and since Q′ is a refinement of Q, L also solves Q.
Corollary 2. An epistemic space S = (S,O) is learnable in the limit iff it is countable and satisfies the
T D separation axiom.
Proof. Apply Theorem 2 to the learning question {{s} | s ∈ S}, noticing that the fact that all its answers
are ω-constructible is equivalent to all singletons being locally closed, which is just another formulation
of the T D axiom.
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6 Universality of Conditioning
Our aim in this section is to show that AGM conditioning is “universal”: every solvable problem can be
solved by some AGM agent. First, we introduce an auxiliary notion, that of a problem being directly
solvable by AGM conditioning.
Given a question Q on an epistemic space (S,O), any total order E ⊆ Q×Q on (the answers of)
the question Q induces in a canonical way a total preorder ≤⊆ S×S, obtained by:
s ≤ t iff AsEAt
(where As is the unique answer As ∈Q such that s ∈ As).
Definition 11. A problem P = (S,Q) is directly solvable by conditioning if it is solvable by AGM con-
ditioning with respect to (a prior ≤ that is canonically induced, as explained above, by) a total order
E⊆Q×Q on (the answers of) the question Q.
Direct solvability by conditioning essentially means that the problem can be solved by a conditioning
agent who does not attempt to refine the original question: she forms beliefs only about the answers to
the given question, and is thus indifferent between states satisfying the same answer. Direct solvability
by conditioning is thus a very stringent condition, and unsurprisingly this form of conditioning is not
universal.
Proposition 5. (K. Genin, personal communication) Not every solvable problem is directly solvable by
conditioning.
Proof. Let P be the problem in Example 3, depicted on the left-hand side of Figure 1. It is easy to see that
this problem cannot be directly solvable by conditioning. Indeed, if {t,u}⊳{s,v} then v is not learnable
by ⊳-conditioning; if {s,v} < {t,u} then t is not learnable by ⊳-conditioning; while if {t,u} and {s,v}
are equally plausible, then neither t nor v are learnable.
But P can be refined to a directly solvable problem, namely the “learning question” P′ (depicted on
the right-hand side of Figure 1), which can be directly solvable (e.g. if we set {t}⊳ {s}⊳ {v}⊳ {u}).
As a consequence, P can itself be solved by (non-direct) conditioning (with respect to the order t < s <
v < u).
This counterexample suggests a way to prove our intended universality result: it is enough to show
that every solvable problem has a refinement that is directly solvable by conditioning. To do this, we first
need a structural characterization of direct solvability.
Lemma 5. (Topological Characterization of Direct Solvability by Conditioning) A problem P= (S,Q)
is directly solvable by conditioning iff Q is linearly separated.
Proof. Left-to-right implication: Suppose that P is directly solvable by conditioning with respect to (a
prior≤ that is canonically induced by) a total orderE⊆Q×Q. Then, for every s∈ S choose some sound
and complete data stream ~OS = (Osn)n∈ω for s (with Ons ∈ O ⊆ τS). Direct solvability by conditioning
implies then that there exists some Ns such that Min≤(Os1, . . . ,OsNs)⊆ As. Set Us :=
⋂Ns
i=1 Osi ∈ τS, so that
we have s ∈Us and Min≤Us ⊆ As. Then set UA :=
⋃
s∈AUs ∈ τS for every answer A ∈Q. We claim that
UA “separates” A from the union of all the answers B⊳A (as linear separation demands): indeed, by the
construction of UA, it is obvious that (1) A⊆UA, and also that Min≤UA ⊆ A. By unfolding the last clause
in terms of E, we obtain that: AEB holds for all B ∈Q such that UA∩B 6= /0. Since E is a total order on
A. Baltag, N. Gierasimczuk & S. Smets 95
Q, this is equivalent to: (2) UA∩B = /0 for all B⊳A. By (1) and (2) together, we obtain that Q is linearly
separated.
Right-to-left implication: Suppose Q is linearly separated. Let E be a total order on Q that linearly
separates it. This means that, for every answer A ∈ Q, there exists some open set UA ∈ τS such that
A ⊆UA and UA∩B = /0 for all B⊳A. For each s ∈ S, we set Us := UAs (where As is the unique answer
As ∈Q with s ∈ As).
Let ≤ be the total preorder on S canonically induced by the order E⊆Q×Q (by s ≤ t iff AsEAt).
We show now that P is directly solvable by conditioning with respect to ≤. For this, let s∈ S be any state,
and ~O = (On)n∈ω be a sound and complete stream for s. Completeness of the stream implies that there
must exist some N ∈ ω such that
⋂N
i=1 Oi ⊆Us.
To conclude our proof, it is enough to show the following
Claim: For every n≥ N, we have
s ∈Min≤(
n⋂
i=1
Oi)⊆ As.
First, let us see why this Claim is enough to give us direct solvability by conditioning. The fact that
s ∈ Min≤(
⋂n
i=1 Oi) implies that Min≤(
⋂n
i=1 Oi) 6= /0, for all n ≥ N. A previous observation tells us that,
when applied to such data streams, the AGM agent L ≤ produces a “principal filter”, given by
L
≤(O1, . . . ,On) = {P ⊆ S | Min≤(
n⋂
i=1
Oi)⊆ P}.
By the Claim above we have Min≤(
⋂n
i=1 Oi) ⊆ As, and hence we obtain As ∈ L ≤(O1, . . . ,On), for all
n ≥ N.
Proof of Claim: Let n ≥ N. To prove the Claim, it is enough to show the following two implications
(for all states t):
(1) t ∈ ⋂ni=1 Oi ⇒ s ≤ t;
(2) t ∈ Min≤(
⋂n
i=1 Oi) ⇒ At = As.
To show (1), let t ∈
⋂n
i=1 Oi. Then t ∈Us (since
⋂n
i=1 Oi ⊆
⋂N
i=1 Oi ⊆Us), so Us∩At 6= /0. Hence (by
linear separation) we must have AsEAt , i.e., s≤ t.
To show (2), let t ∈ Min≤(
⋂n
i=1 Oi). This implies that t ≤ s (since s ∈
⋂n
i=1 Oi). But by (1), we also
have s ≤ t, and hence s ≤ t ≤ s. This means that AsEAt EAs. But E is a total order on Q, so it follows
that At = As.
Theorem 3. AGM conditioning is a universal problem-solving method, i.e., every solvable problem is
solvable by some AGM agent.
Proof. Let P be a solvable problem. From Theorem 2, Proposition 3 and Lemma 2, it follows that P
has a linearly separated refinement P′. By Lemma 5, that refinement is (directly) solvable by an AGM
agent L≤. It is obvious (from the definition of solvability) that any doxastic agent which solves the more
refined problem P′ solves also the original problem P.
Corollary 3. AGM conditioning is a universal learning method, i.e., every learnable space is learnable
by some AGM agent.
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Proof. Apply the previous result to the finest question Q := {{s} | s ∈ S}.
In contrast, recall that the counterexample in Proposition 2 showed that standard AGM agents have
a very limited problem-solving power. Standard conditioning is not a universal learning method (while
general AGM conditioning is universal). This means that allowing prior plausibility orders that are non-
wellfounded is essential for achieving universality of conditioning. Beliefs generated in this way may
occasionally fail to be globally consistent. (Indeed, note that in the counterexample from Proposition 2,
the beliefs of the non-standard AGM agent who learns the space are initially globally inconsistent. In
conclusion, occasional global inconsistencies are the unavoidable price for the universality of AGM
conditioning.
7 Conclusions and Connections to Other Work
The general topological setting for problem-solving assumed here is a variation of the one championed
by Kelly in various talks [23] and in unpublished work [24, 25], though until recently we did not realize
this close similarity. Our topological characterizations of verifiable, falsifiable and decidable properties
are generalizations of results by Kelly [20], who proved characterizations for the special case of Baire
spaces.10 Our result on learning-universality (Corollary 3) is also a generalization of analogue results
by Kelly [21, 26], and Kelly, Schulte and Hendricks [19]. But our generalization to arbitrary spaces is
highly non-trivial, requiring the use of the T D characterization. In contrast, the Baire space satisfies
the much stronger separation axiom T 1, which trivializes the specialization order, and so the proof of
learning-universality is much easier in this special case: any total ω-like ordering of the space can be
used for conditioning. Nevertheless, in a sense, this result is just a topological re-packaging of one of
our own previous results [13, 3, 4].
While writing this paper, we learned that our T D characterization of learnability (Corollary 2) was
independently re-proven by Konstantin Genin ([11], unpublished manuscript), soon after we announced
its proof. This characterization is actually a topological translation of a classical characterization of
identifiability in the limit [2], and in fact it also follows from a result by de Brecht and Yamamoto [9],
who prove it for so-called “concept spaces”.
Our key new results are far-reaching and highly non-trivial: the topological characterization of solv-
ability (Theorem 2), and the universality of AGM condition for problem-solving (Theorem 3). They
required the introduction of new topological concepts (e.g., pseudo-stratifications and linearly separated
partitions), and some non-trivial proofs of new topological results.
Philosophically, the importance of these results is that, on the one hand they fully vindicate the gen-
eral topological program in Inductive Epistemology started by Kelly and others [20, 30], and on the other
hand they reassert the power and applicability of the AGM Belief Revision Theory against its critics. To
this conclusion, we need to add an important proviso: our results show that, in order to achieve problem-
solving universality, AGM agents need to (a) be “creative”, by going beyond the original problem (i.e.,
finding a more refined problem that can be solved directly, and forming prior beliefs about the answer
to this more refined question), and (b) admit non-standard priors, which occasionally will lead to beliefs
that are globally inconsistent (although still locally consistent). Such occasional global inconsistencies
can give rise to a type of “infinite Lottery Paradox”. But this is the price that AGM agents have to pay in
10In unpublished work [25] the authors claim a characterization of solvability in a general setting. Their characterization is
sightly “looser” than ours, and can be easily obtained from ours. Our tighter characterization is the one needed for proving
universality.
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order to be able to solve every solvable question. Whether or not this is a price that is worth paying is a
different, more vague and more “ideological” question, although a very interesting one. But this question
lies beyond the scope of this paper.
8 Acknowledgments
We thank Johan van Benthem, Nick Bezhanishvili, Konstantin Genin, Thomas Icard and Kevin Kelly for
their useful feedback on issues related to this paper. Johan helped us place belief-based learning within
the larger context of long-term doxastic protocols [7], and beyond this he gave us his continuous support
and encouragement for our work on this line of inquiry. Nick pointed to us the connections between our
work and the notions of TD-space and locally closed set. Konstantin pointed to us the connections to the
notion of stratification and gave the counterexample proving Proposition 5. His critical feedback on our
early drafts was really essential for clarifying our thoughts and cleaning up our proofs, and so it’s fair to
say that this paper in its current form owes a lot to Konstantin Genin. Thomas Icard’s comments on a
previous draft and our friendly interactions with him on related topics during our Stanford visits are very
much appreciated. Finally, Kevin Kelly’s work forms of course the basis and the inspiration for ours.
Our frequent discussions with him in recent years influenced the development of our own perspective
on the topic. He also gave us excellent reference tips concerning the history of the connections between
topology and formal epistemology, as well as concerning his more recent work on related issues.
Nina Gierasimczuk’s work on this paper was funded by an Innovational Research Incentives Scheme
Veni grant 275-20-043, Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). Sonja Smets was
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